{"id":4290,"date":"2012-12-13T03:24:13","date_gmt":"2012-12-13T09:24:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.crescentcityjewishnews.com\/?p=4290"},"modified":"2012-12-13T03:24:13","modified_gmt":"2012-12-13T09:24:13","slug":"feature-israels-friends-in-gaza","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.crescentcityjewishnews.com\/blog\/feature-israels-friends-in-gaza\/","title":{"rendered":"FEATURE: Israel’s friends in Gaza"},"content":{"rendered":"

By ALEX JOFFE<\/p>\n

(Jewish Ideas Daily) — Hamas was quick to declare victory in the latest conflict with Israel.\u00a0A closer look at the price it paid in terms of personnel and equipment shows that its bravado was false.\u00a0But the fact that Israel was able to destroy so many installations, weapons teams, smuggling tunnels, and high-ranking personnel, including Hamas\u2019s military chief, Ahmed Jabari, reveals another, less evident fact: substantial numbers of people in Gaza have \u201cbetrayed the Palestinian cause,\u201d in Hamas\u2019s terms, and collaborated with Israel by providing it with intelligence.<\/p>\n

Israeli intelligence capabilities are estimable, but collecting precise information about an enemy territory like Gaza poses particular problems.\u00a0Israel\u2019s intelligence collection starts in space, where Israeli satellites (like their far more numerous U.S. counterparts) track Iranian weapons moving by ship to Sudan, Egypt, the Sinai, and the Gaza coast.\u00a0But these satellites make their rounds only a few times a day.\u00a0Compensating for this limitation, Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles can stay aloft for hours or even days.\u00a0Night and day, electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensors\u00a0allow the aircraft to see what goes on above ground and, to a limited extent, even below it, by detecting minute variations in heat or soil composition.\u00a0The drones detect and jam electronic communications.\u00a0They are the eyes of attack aircraft and artillery and can even attack targets themselves.<\/p>\n

But what Israel accomplished in its bombing campaign required more information than drones can provide.\u00a0There were strikes on 1,500 sites, including 19 command centers, 140 tunnels, and 26 weapons manufacturing and storage facilities, as well as what an IDF spokesman laconically called \u201chundreds of underground rocket launchers\u201d and \u201cdozens of rocket launchers and launch sites.\u201d\u00a0This feat could have been accomplished only with the much richer information that Israel had: a vast, three-dimensional map of Gaza\u2019s every street, block, building, and floor, including names of families, their relationships, and their telephone numbers.\u00a0And movements in and out of this maze were not only mapped but to some extent tracked in real time.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s vast targeting lists could have been compiled only through use of human informants.<\/p>\n

Since the beginning of the Zionist enterprise, substantial numbers of Palestinians have been willing to work with it, selling land and providing information.\u00a0Many of them, as Hillel Cohen makes clear in his book \u201cArmy of Shadows\u201d<\/em>(University of California Press), have done so for their own reasons, such as personal gain, family grudges, social divisions, and a kind of \u201clocal nationalism\u201d that aimed to preserve their particular lands and possessions. Such motivations are still at work.\u00a0Some, Cohen notes, actually view collaboration with Israel as patriotic, because it pursues a vision of the Palestinian national project — not Judeophilic, certainly, but resigned to Israel — that is marginally realistic.<\/p>\n

Mainstream Palestinian movements are understandably bitter about this phenomenon: few epithets are more contemptuous than \u201ccollaborator,\u201d and the shocking recent spectacle of\u00a0bodies of murdered collaborators being dragged behind Hamas-driven motorcycles sent a clear message (though, it turned out, at least one of those murdered was not a collaborator but an Islamist rival).<\/p>\n

Under this circumstance, the fact that Gazans inform at all is notable; and the extent of collaboration, though unquantifiable, is clearly large.\u00a0It speaks to the failure of Palestinian nationalism, as opposed to local and family identification, to attract the loyalty of Palestinians.\u00a0 Villages and clans remain more dependable and predictable repositories of allegiance than the reliably authoritarian and kleptocratic Fatah movement.<\/p>\n

The fact of collaboration also shows the shortcomings of Hamas\u2019s Islamized version of Palestinian nationalism, confounding easy notions about Hamas\u2019s iron control and the radicalization of the populace, as opposed to the leadership.\u00a0Hamas leaders indeed love death, but for other people.\u00a0They are happy to consign eager young men to suicide and to contemplate the blood of the children who are sacrificed as human shields when Hamas hides near schools and hospitals to avoid Israeli airstrikes.<\/p>\n

The attraction of dying for Islam has limits.\u00a0Gazans, like other Palestinians, have no love for Jews and Israel and readily celebrate their murder; but they are not anxious to die themselves.<\/p>\n

Does this realization change the military calculus? It certainly made possible the most detailed sort of pinpoint bombing campaign. It also shifts perceptions of the conflict, at least slightly.\u00a0 But it yields few specific prescriptions.\u00a0Palestinian collaboration, however widespread, is hardly a sign of a people who wish to be free, or even free of Hamas.\u00a0As America discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, militarily defeating fascism, religious or otherwise, means little unless populations challenge its patriarchal, theocratic, or authoritarian culture.\u00a0Supplying human intelligence is not the same thing.\u00a0So, the war continues.<\/p>\n

(Alex Joffe is a contributing writer to Jewish Ideas Daily.<\/em>This article was first published by Jewish Ideas Daily (www.jewishideasdaily.com<\/a>) and is reprinted with permission.)<\/em><\/p>\n

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