The Jewish state is not merely a problem for others to manage. It is a partner offering capabilities its neighbors want.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
The lesson for Israel\u2019s critics is uncomfortable: The Jewish state is not merely a problem for others to manage. It is a partner offering capabilities its neighbors want. Cooperation grounded in reciprocal interests is more durable than either ideological enthusiasm or a shared dislike of a third country.<\/p>\n
Energy provides both a major opportunity and a warning against complacency. The European Commission describes the Great Sea Interconnector as a project linking Greece and Cyprus first, with Israel envisaged at a later stage. For Nicosia, it promises a direct electricity connection to Greece; for the wider partnership, it would give physical substance to regional connectivity.<\/p>\n
But an ambition is not an operating cable. The French-flagged survey vessel Abeille Marengo<\/i> reached Crete on Oct. 27 and was awaiting a NAVTEX maritime notice, now expected in early November, before resuming seabed surveys. Reuters<\/i> had reported in mid-October that the project applied to restart the work after months of delay amid the Greek-Turkish maritime dispute, with Ankara insisting on prior coordination.<\/p>\n
The Israel-Greece-Cyprus relationship need not be presented as an anti-Turkish alliance. Nevertheless, the obstacles confronting shared infrastructure demonstrate why diplomatic backing and sustained political attention matter. Electoral uncertainty cannot be allowed to become an excuse for strategic drift.<\/p>\n
Washington also has a stake in this. In June 2026, the United States, Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Rice University signed a declaration of intent to establish an Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in Houston. This is not a guarantee that every project will succeed. It is further evidence that cooperation is acquiring an institutional life beyond the three leaders\u2019 offices.<\/p>\n
How, then, should Athens and Nicosia read the coalition possibilities?<\/p>\n
A renewed Netanyahu-led government would offer a familiar interlocutor. Its practical value would depend less on the prime minister\u2019s name than on the coalition\u2019s stability and capacity to implement commitments. Familiarity without delivery would not be enough.<\/p>\n
An Eisenkot-led alternative would require new political relationships, but it would inherit the same geography, security interests and institutional commitments. The Bennett precedent warns against assuming that a change of government means a change of strategic orientation. Coalition composition could affect priorities, budgets and diplomatic tone without overturning the partnership itself.<\/p>\n
A broad unity arrangement could provide greater room for long-term decisions, although opposition leaders\u2019 stated refusals to serve under Netanyahu mean it cannot be treated as the default outcome. Prolonged deadlock would create the clearest risk of delay: Officials could maintain routine cooperation while major initiatives competed for the attention of a politically constrained leadership.<\/p>\n
These scenarios differ politically, but their strategic lesson is similar: governing capacity matters more than partisan preference.<\/p>\n
Continuity also should not be confused with unconditional agreement. Mitsotakis explicitly defended Greece\u2019s freedom to criticize Israeli government policies while preserving the strategic relationship. A mature partnership must accommodate disagreements without allowing every dispute to threaten its foundations.<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s next government should therefore make early engagement with Athens and Nicosia a priority. It should reaffirm existing commitments, identify which projects can realistically advance and protect working-level cooperation from coalition turbulence. Greece and Cyprus, in turn, should judge their Israeli partner by its commitments and conduct, not domestic political labels.<\/p>\n
The partnership is not irreversible, and no serious analysis should pretend otherwise. Projects can stall; governments can disagree; political attention can wander. But the evidence supports a durable strategic direction, not a relationship awaiting permission to exist from the next coalition.<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s election will determine who governs the Jewish state. It should not obscure why Greece and Cyprus have chosen to work with it. The people around the cabinet table may change. The national interests connecting Jerusalem, Athens and Nicosia will not disappear with them.<\/p>\n
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